For RSS-BJP-Hindutva, Gandhi is the Real Enemy: Ashutosh

The 2024 Lok Sabha election was both exhausting and exhilarating, and you distilled its complexities into Reclaiming Bharat. As a senior journalist, what was your process for capturing this pivotal moment?

Thank you so much because it’s a privilege to be interviewed by Frontline magazine, which I have always admired for decades. Reclaiming Bharat is not a chronicling of events. This book is an attempt to understand the transformative changes which the country is going through since 2014. And within that context, I’ve tried to analyse the 2024 parliamentary election.

This is a sequel to my earlier book called Hindu Rashtra. Because in Hindu Rashtra, I did not chronicle events. I tried to analyse, dissect, and understand the five years of the Narendra Modi government from 2014 to 2019 within an ideological framework. What I personally believe is that this is the march of an ideological state. The transfer of power that happened between Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi is not an ordinary transfer of power. I compare it with the transfer of power which has taken place on August 15, 1947.

Till Manmohan Singh’s government, there was largely a collective understanding about the basic parameters of Indian society and Indian polity—the constitutional consensus, the democratic consensus, or the Nehruvian consensus. That consensus was broken with the transfer of power from Manmohan Singh to Narendra Modi. The ideology is Hindutva. And Hindutva ideology is diametrically opposite to constitutionalism, to the rule of law in the country, and to the Nehruvian consensus.

Like a Left revolution, this is what we are witnessing today is a right wing revolution. It’s a Hindutva revolution. Revolution has three distinctive characteristics: it disconnects itself from the past, it disrupts the present, and it deconstructs the future. Disconnectedness from the past means it doesn’t want to connect itself with the Nehruvian consensus. That’s why you hear from fringe elements that India got freedom in 2014.

There is a reconstruction of the collective minds at an industrial level. Many who witnessed the politics before 2014, after 2014, when we talk to them, you get a shock. Even family members are so vehemently unrecognisable these days. This has happened because the RSS has been very categorical, and with the help of the state and state-sponsored propaganda, it has reconstructed collective minds at industrial level.

You talked about the Nehruvian consensus. You have described Narendra Modi’s 2014 rise as a “revolution”. Only recently, Yogendra Yadav called the 2019 results the “end of India’s first republic”. How does you characterise the 2024 election outcome?

Yogendra Yadav is a friend of mine, but I do not agree with his hypothesis fully. Because if you want to understand 2019 and call it the death of the first republic, then what about 2014? The process was on from 2014 onwards when these forces captured the state. Not captured in the sense but in a democratic space. They were part of the democratic process.

Why did the nature of the state not change when Atal Bihari Vajpayee was the Prime Minister and an RSS swayamsevak? It’s only because it was a coalition government. In 2014, when Modi became the Prime Minister, they had an absolute majority in Parliament. This was the golden opportunity for them to implement their agenda.

The BJP had never ever hidden its agenda. They talked about Article 370, they’ve been talking about uniform civil code, Ramjanmabhoomi, pseudo-secularism, Muslim appeasement. When they formed the government they had every right to implement their agenda like other political parties did.

The difference was earlier, there was more or less consensus about constitutionalism, equality, liberty, and fraternity, consensus about plural society, democratic process, that India has to be an inclusive society, not an exclusive society. There was no attempt to chase a utopia called Hindu Rashtra because with the adoption of the constitution, that utopia was achieved. But here, a political force was operating within the four walls of the Constitution, but they were not happy with that.

You also note in your book that there have been efforts to dismantle that Nehruvian consensus and malign Jawaharlal Nehru. Given the 2024 results which denied the BJP a solo majority, what does it mean for Nehru’s idea of pluralistic India?

See, this is the fundamental question which both books are trying to explore, why they want to dismantle Nehruvian thought process. Frankly speaking, they are not dismantling Nehruvian thought process, they are dismantling Gandhian thought process. Nehru is only the first milestone in that direction.

The RSS and Hindutva know in their heart that this is not the right time to annihilate Gandhian ideas because Gandhi is too powerful. Since Gandhi was not in the government [but] Nehru was in the government and ran a government for 17 years. So, somebody who is in the government, it’s easy to criticise.

Gandhi chose Nehru as a successor because Gandhi knew that the ideas he has postulated are the best of Indian civilisation. Nehru is the only one which can take it forward. We should be thankful to Gandhi that he chose Nehru as a successor.

The RSS, the BJP, and Hindutva basically want to dismantle the entire edifice created by Mahatma Gandhi. Since they can’t attack him right now, they are using Nehru to damage that edifice to a substantial level. Gandhi is the real enemy. The RSS fundamentally believes that Hindus were too soft and too timid. That is why they were ruled by Muslims and then Christians.

Savarkar puts it in his book Six Glorious Epochs of Indian History, where all the good things about Hindu civilisation are perverted virtues. Savarkar thinks that India became a slave of Muslims and Christians because of these virtues. Gandhi epitomises these values. Gandhi talks about Satya, Ahimsa, and the RSS has a problem with non-violence because they think non-violence has made Hindus too timid.

When they talk about dismantling Nehruvian consensus, they are basically in the process of dismantling the Gandhian consensus. It’s not only a political battle, it’s not only an ideological battle. It’s basically a civilisational battle too.

You have written a chapter about the Election Commission of India (“When the Referee Goes Rogue”). The ECI faced intense scrutiny over EVM efficacy and institutional credibility leading up to the 2024 election. How do you assess the validity of these concerns?

Reform is not possible till this government is there. You don’t need a reform. The Election Commission is one institution, like any other institution. If the people occupying the post don’t succumb to the pressures of ideology called Hindutva, they will not be there. They are very carefully chosen to work for the creation of Hindu Rashtra.

And that’s why you must have seen the radical change in the Indian media. This radical change is only because of the ideological pressures. The whole edifice of Indian state is now working within that ideological framework. The fight with the judiciary is for the simple reason because judiciary is trying to guard their independence. Thankfully, judiciary has not surrendered till now. But the Election Commission has surrendered completely.

I had covered the Election Commission when [former Chief Election Commissioner] T.N. Seshan was there. If T.N. Seshan could do so much within that framework, these people operating within the same framework couldn’t perform because they don’t want to perform. The concerns raised by different political parties about how the ECI failed to provide a level playing field are genuine concerns.

About the EVM thing, I don’t have any evidence so I will not talk about it. But yes, the ECI is totally aligned with the government. It is an extended office of the Bharatiya Janata Party. The 2024 parliamentary election has been the most communal election, most provocative election. But the Election Commission was sleeping somewhere else.

In your book, one chapter highlights tactical Muslim voting in 2024, which was key to denying the BJP a majority. What does this portend for India’s Muslim community during Modi’s third term?

Muslims are going through a tough time, there is no doubt about it. If you talk to the large section of Muslim intellectuals, the Muslim middle class, they are going through a huge trauma. Many confided in me privately that they never thought India will be like this. They always believed India is a secular, plural society and Hindus are most tolerant. Their identity as Muslims was never questioned.

What hurts them is when we question their commitment to the country, their patriotism, their nationalism. That is what has hurt them. Earlier, they used to react, get very excited about any attack. In this election, they used their silence as a weapon of retaliation. They realised in a society where they are much less in number, only 14 per cent of the population, it’s better not to get provoked.

They strategically thought that Muslims should not go in herds, should not be wearing their identities all the time, and they should be silently going and voting without being provoked. The BJP, despite trying to polarise the elections, up to a certain extent they did succeed, but not to a large extent.

The Muslims have also reached the conclusion that whether the Shia is targeted or the Sunni is targeted, whether the Syed is targeted, the Pasmandas are targeted—the Muslim identity per se is in danger. So let’s forget about our differences. Let’s be together. That’s why in the last few years there’s hardly any clashes between the Shias and the Sunnis.

They’ve also rejected the clergy because they believe the clergy, these religious so-called leaders, have damaged the image of society more than anybody else. A new middle class, a literate middle class, is emerging among the Muslims who are focussing on businesses and education—if you are educated enough, if you are economically well off then you will have more power in the structure.

Moving to Uttar Pradesh: you have detailed Awadhesh Prasad Pasi’s secular campaign in Faizabad, which countered the BJP’s Ram Mandir narrative. But the BJP’s recent Milkipur byelection win shows the BJP’s resilience. Can the Samajwadi Party’s PDA (Picchda-Dalit-Alpasankhyak) coalition model effectively challenge Yogi Adityanath’s Hindutva dominance in 2027?

I think two most important developments occurred in the 2024 parliamentary election. One was purely political. The other was purely ideological. The Varanasi election is purely political because it busted the myth that Modi is invincible. Whereas Ayodhya is an ideological thing. A person who was supposed to be invincible, who had never lost an election, was literally on the verge of losing that election.

Amit Shah was stationed there in Varanasi in the last two days before polling. Imagine if he had not been there. The most powerful person after the Prime Minister was holding the fort for the Prime Minister. The government must have had some information. That is why Amit Shah was sent on an emergency duty.

Look at Ayodhya. Two months back, the Ram Mandir temple was consecrated with such pomp. And the BJP is losing. The person who was defeating them has coined one of the most radical slogans. Where was he coining this? In Ayodhya. Ayodhya is the reason for the resurgence of the BJP. Before the Ayodhya movement, the BJP was nowhere. It was reduced to only two seats.

The whole edifice of the BJP’s ideology, that is Hindutva, comes down crashing. If you can lose in Ayodhya then what is the guarantee you won’t lose elsewhere? That shows the fragility of the ideology.

You write about how the “Save Constitution” campaign and the caste census demand resonated with Dalit and OBC voters in 2024 and boosted the INDIA bloc’s numbers. Now you have had the Modi government’s recent caste census announcement. Do you see it as a genuine response to public pressure or just a strategic move?

This is basically an electoral compulsion that has dictated the BJP to accept the caste census. Otherwise, ideologically the BJP and the RSS will never accept a caste census. Because in their thesis, the RSS believed that Hindus were dominated by Muslims and Christians for such a long period in history because Hindus were divided into different castes. So there was no Hindu unity.

But they also know that since 2014, a large section of Hindu society could be radicalised or ideologised because they had a Prime Minister who is RSS-bred. Through the national government, they could capture different institutions and get legitimacy for the RSS ideology and Hindutva.

Dalits and OBCs derive their identity through the Constitution. Before the adoption of the Constitution, there was no concept of equality in this country. It was a very unequal society. The Constitution has brought that equality. So, legally speaking, constitutionally speaking, everybody is equal. But the concept of social equality is still missing.

The Dalits and OBCs know that they can get social equality as long as the Constitution is there. If the Constitution is not there tomorrow, then they will be back to square one. They will be treated the way they had been treated in the past. So for them, it became a matter of existence. And they comprise 70 per cent of the population.

This is where the genius of Rahul Gandhi lies. He is the one man who has been consistently talking about the caste census when everybody ridiculed him, mocked him, insulted him. He was vehement about this and also tried to implement it in Karnataka and Telangana.

The BJP realised that if this genie gets out of the bottle, then the tables will be turned. Because of the electoral compulsion, they have gone for the caste census. Ideologically, the BJP and RSS don’t want a caste census. But because of electoral compulsion, they have no other option than to do it reluctantly.

In your book, you have argued that voters rejected Modi’s divinity claims in 2024. But the BJP’s subsequent wins in Haryana, Maharashtra, and Delhi, with Modi less prominent in those campaigns, suggest adaptability. Are you hinting at the BJP planning a post-Modi era already?

Let’s not talk about the BJP. It’s an RSS government. The BJP is only a political shop. The succession plan will not be decided by the BJP but by the RSS leaders like Mohan Bhagwat. The people sitting in Nagpur will decide the succession.

It’s like a big company that has different verticals. Mohan Bhagwat is the chairman of the company called the RSS. The BJP is one of the verticals. And Modi, as a CEO, heads that vertical. Things will be decided at the RSS level, not at the BJP level. Look at the BJP—it has failed to appoint its party president for almost one and a half years. Why? Because the RSS doesn’t agree with the choices given by the BJP.

Now, the RSS has reached the conclusion that the gains which they got through the Modi government are humongous. But the time has come to consolidate that gain. So now onward, they’re looking for a leader who can help them save the gains, help them consolidate, and be patient enough to plan for the next leap.

Somebody more moderate than Modi. Somebody who could combine Hindutva in its core but seems to be more democratic, more modern, more inclusive in appearance, in perception. Somebody younger, because it’s not that Modi will be replaced by Rajnath Singh, who’s of his age. But I still don’t feel that Modi is going to be replaced very soon.

The INDIA bloc showed unity post the 2024 results in Parliament. But leaders like Tejashwi Yadav and Omar Abdullah have recently questioned its viability. Can this bloc sustain cohesion until 2029?

The sad part is that the INDIA bloc as a whole has not been able to grasp the enormity of the crisis through which the country is going. That’s a problem with the regional leaders who are more worried about their region, their State, the politics in that State. Many of them lack the national perspective which is needed at the moment.

More or less all the coalition partners are competing for the same space, the same secular liberal space. So if the Congress gets very powerful, improves its vote shares or seat numbers then obviously it will eat into the pie of its allies because they share the same sociopolitical space.

This coalition is only a strategic coalition. Despite having ideological affinity, it is not a sustainable coalition for a very long time. Take the case of Bihar. Nitish Kumar has a different social base altogether: the Janata Dal (United) has secular credentials, a Muslim vote bank. The BJP’s social base is entirely different. So Nitish Kumar and the BJP are not competing for the same sociopolitical space but Tejashwi Yadav [of the Rashtriya Janata Dal] and the CPI(M), the CPI(M-L), and the Congress are competing for the same sociopolitical space.

One thing for which Rahul Gandhi never gets credit is that he has succeeded in creating a parallel ideological edifice with three elements. One is secularism: through the Bharat Jodo Yatra, when he got the confidence and support of the people. But his secularism is not a negation of religion but engages with religion.

Point number two is the politics of social justice. The Congress has never done the politics of social justice. That was done by Mulayam Singh, Ram Manohar Lohia, Karpoori Thakur, Vishwanath Pratap Singh, and others. Rahul Gandhi has concluded that unless the Congress gets the support of a substantial chunk of the OBCs it will be difficult for Congress to bounce back at the national level.

The third is constitutionalism. So these are the three pillars of the new ideology—secularism, social justice, and constitutionalism. I will not say it is spelled out as robustly as Hindutva is, but I could see that a parallel ideological edifice is being created.

Rahul should be given credit for saying the fight is not with Modi but with the RSS. He has identified where the battle should be fought. Tomorrow, if Modi is not there, somebody else from the BJP and the RSS will come and pursue almost the same course. Unless Hindutva is fought, unless Hindutva is discredited, it will be difficult for the BJP to be defeated.

The opposition is trying to reclaim the ground which they have conceded to the BJP, whereas the government is trying to reclaim the ground which they think in history they have conceded to the Muslims and the Christians. The opposition is trying to reclaim the Bharat which they have lost since 2014, whose pillars were constitutionalism, democracy, secularism, rule of law, freedom of expression, Nehruvian ideas, Gandhian ideas.

This year is the centenary of the RSS, and your book’s epilogue explores its internal turmoil post the 2024 results. Given the BJP’s recent Assembly election successes and Mohan Bhagwat’s more accommodative stance, do you think the RSS can adopt a similar stance towards marginalised sections of Indian society?

Hindutva and constitutionalism are inimical to each other. There’s no doubt about it. The BJP and the RSS, in its heart, don’t accept this Constitution. When the Constitution was adopted, they said there’s nothing Indian in this Constitution and Hindus will not accept this.

Savarkar said almost the same thing. Deendayal Upadhyaya in 1965 said that Indian Constitution is a threat to India’s unity, integrity. Deendayal never accepted the Indian federal structure. He said this is a sign of weakness. He also talked about “Dharma Rajya”: that if one person is with the “Dharma” then the parliament and majority doesn’t matter.

Mohan Bhagwat today is a worried man. The RSS leadership have realised that the way Hindutva is going there is a possibility that it can get discredited. Like political Islam got discredited at the global level. Today political Islam is perceived as a violent ideology, an intolerant ideology. The kind of negative press that the Modi government and Hindutva has got at the global level has really made them think.

The RSS is a very resilient organisation, a very patient organisation willing to wait for another 25 years. They don’t want to get discredited the way political Islam has been discredited. There is a realisation that this is the time when they should consolidate their gain, wait, and then take a new ideological leap in future.

For Narendra Modi, becoming Prime Minister again can be his priority. But for the RSS, capturing power is important but their goal is Hindu unity. If they realise that forming the government can damage their Hindu unity project then they can disown politics.

That’s why Bhagwat is saying “without Muslim there is no Hindu”. These are voices which seem strange because they give an impression that the RSS is inclusive. No, that is not true. They are very happy with the gains Hindutva has made. But they want to dispel the perception that Hindutva is divisive, violent, intolerant.

The problem is they have trained generations of swayamsevaks with a mindset based on hate. Now they’re telling their karyakartas not to hate. It’s like they’re mounted on a ferocious tiger and telling the tiger to stop eating non-vegetarian, eat vegetarian. The tiger can say “you taught me to eat something else, now you’re telling me to eat something else. I’ll prefer to eat you than eat vegetables.”

How they will control it depends on how they manage things from here onwards, which will decide the longevity of Hindutva. If they remain adventurous as they are now, calling Muslims infiltrators or digging everywhere to find a Shivling, it’s dangerous. The RSS has to do a lot of work to tame the tiger, wait for some time, and then wait for the leap.